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Abstract 
The new management arrangements for Barcelona’s El Prat airport are yet to be finalised. Two Catalan business associations – 
the Cercle d’Economia and Cambra de Comerç – are amongst the actors attempting to negotiate a final formula. Though based on 
attributed influence focused on the perceptions of internal witnesses, the study indicates that during the last two years, these two 
quite different associations both achieved a degree of representation of their interests in relation to the management of El Prat. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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Introduction 
   This is an organisational study that tries to debate what are the networks developed for successful regional 
lobbying from two Catalan business associations. External, organisational impacts and effects are used to analyse 
the networks of the two associations. Two interest groups are shown in action. So, the strategies of representation 
are compared: namely, the mix of alliances, coalitions, leadership sharing, affiliation networks, and attempts at 
negotiation all of which are intended to extend and enhance the influence of the two bodies.  
   The issue of the most suitable management structure for El Prat, the principal airport serving the Barcelona 
area, provides empirical evidence for the intervention of two regional business associations – the Cercle d´ 
Economia, a think tank, and the Cambra de Comerç - both based in Barcelona - and their use of political lobbying to 
intervene in regional outcomes.  The Cercle and the Cambra make for an interesting comparison since both were 
very active in the present case.  
   El Prat is presently, solely managed by AENA, an agency of the central government. AENA is a public 
business entity, accountable to the Ministry of State for Transport, and charged with the management of Spanish 
airports. Since 2000, the Catalan authorities have pursued a greater role in the management of the airport, favouring 
a consortium structure, formed by the state, the Generalitat (Catalan government) and local administrations, and 
last, a private sector presence. Looking to the models in place around Europe, pressure for shared management 
under some formula has increased again in 2007, with Catalan business associations lobbying for change (Interview 
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Bel). It is seen as a fundamental issue because the management of the airport has very important consequences for 
tourism, trade routes and patterns. 
   The Official Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Navigation of Barcelona was founded in 1886 and follows 
the prescriptions of the basic Law of Official Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Navigation (3/1993) of 
Catalonia and the General Council of the Chambers (06/2002).  With the nature of a corporation of public law, the 
Cambra de Comerç can be said to support general interests.  The CCs offer support with the foundation of 
companies, their internationalisation, the introduction of new technologies, training and skill formation. Promotion 
of foreign trade in general and of experts is also core competences of the chambers. All services are primarily 
targeted at SMEs (Molins and Nonell, 2007).  
   The Cercle de Economia is a think tank that was founded in 1958, though only achieving legal status in 1968. It 
was founded by a group of industrialists and entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and lawyers, modern and European, who 
intended to create a space for political-economic and intellectual debate, often focused on the opening of Spain 
towards Europe. To this day, the Cercle’s main activity lies in forums, round tables, and conferences. 
   A key difference between the two organisations is their financial weight. The budget of the Cambra in 2007 
was around € 31,000,000, a different order to that of the Cercle, at around €1,300,000 in 2007. Unlike the Cercle 
then, the Cambra has a standing team of technical people, capable of undertaking studies of significant size and 
performing technical and professional analysis.  
   The Cercle has approximately 1400 members, of which about 120 are entities paying between €2000 and 
€12,000 contribution, depending on their size. The rest are individual members who pay just €150.The Cercle is 
under pressure to increase its membership and not to lose the members it has. Membership of the Cambra is 
compulsory for businesses in the Barcelona area, and 208,363 members were counted in 2007 (both individual 
memberships and business associations).  
 
2. Method 
 
   The method of ‘attributed influence’ has been used to evaluate the two organisations.  Attributed influence is 
one of the broad approaches to measuring interest group influence in the EU.  “Attributed influence” is mostly 
measured by way of surveys. In a survey, a group can be asked to provide a self-assessment of its influence or a 
peer-assessment of the influence of other groups. This is a very simple method but one of its draw-backs is that self-
estimations of influence can be biased. (Düer, 2007) The author interviewed internal and external members and 
these were drawn from personal contacts. These took the form of semi-structured interviews. Notes were taken and 
the main messages were extracted from these interviews to be placed in the text. Seven interviews were conducted 
with technical workers within the two associations. Five were conducted with decision makers within them, to 
reveal information about lobbying strategy, personnel, and public initiatives. Six interviews were also carried out 
with external experts in order to obtain an expert outsider perspective. Moreover, the author referred to certain 
documents in each of the association’s documentary centres (memories, reports, collections of yearly activities, 
press releases,etc.), as well as relevant works in the literature.   
 
3. Theoretical Background 
 
   Social Network Analysis (henceforth SNA) can be employed to: examine the interactions between nodes 
(actors, groups or institutions); all social interaction can be viewed in network terms.  This is because networks 
describe the relations between actors.  Formal network analysis examines individuals within their institutional 
context and relational contacts. A social network consists of a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations 
defined on them.  The presence of relational information is a critical and defining feature of a social network. 
(Marsh and Rhodes, 1992); (Coen & Thatcher, 2008); (Christopoulos , 2006) 
   Market expansion through globalisation is creating ever larger firms, which are less and less dependent on 
collective forms of political action. This may undermine the influence of associational forms of business 
representation, but it does not make them redundant. Rather, it broadens the variety of political actors, increasing 
differentiation and complexity in modern political life (Coen and Grant, 2006). The common denominator of most 
policy network definitions is that policy –making is not simply a question of design by a single, monolithic actor 
(the state). It emerges from the interaction of multiple actors participating in the formulation and implementation of 
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public and sometimes private policies. Policy networks may be developed showing which kind of actors are 
identified, how their interaction is conceived and how the functional operation of the whole policy system is 
modelled. In the present paper, business associations are posited as a fundamental actor, and some network 
connections are adduced. Schneider points out that the notion of policy networks stresses the exchange of resources 
between actors in contrast to more hierarchical, command-oriented models of government (Coen and Grant, 2006). 
 
4. Background of interest groups in Spain  
 
   According to Linz, the organisation and legitimisation of interests requires prolonged periods of political 
stability. Spain’s political history has not been characterised by the institutional stability that permits different social 
groups to create and consolidate independent, autonomous, representative organisations (Giner, 1984). In 
consequence, the establishment of an interest-group representation system took longer.  
   The Francoist regime (1939-1975) established a rigid state corporatism requiring institutions to affiliate 
themselves to such institutions as the vertical unions.  Corporatism is a form of formal interest-group representation 
in the state decision-making process. It has been described as a system of interest intermediation in which 
constituent units are organised in a limited number of special categories, obligatory and non-competitive, ordered 
hierarchically and functionally, each granted a representative monopoly in the category in exchange for control over 
the selection of leaders and the articulation of support and demands. (Molins and Nonell, 2007).  
   During the ‘constituent period’ of Spanish democracy (1975-1978), the constitutional recognition of workers 
unions and business associations together with the recognition of the right to freedom of association were clear steps 
towards the establishment of a democratic system. The Spanish constitution enacted in 1978 specified and extended 
the rights of organised interests. According to Article 22, business organisations were interest organisations (Molins 
and Nonell, ibid).  
   The socialist administration coming to power in 1983 turned for the first time to social forces for the 
elaboration of effective policies. A new social pact was achieved in confronting a serious economic situation (Giner, 
ibid). In 1984, the main business associations and trade unions agreed to negotiate several crucial issues on labour 
ruling and security. Spain took concerted steps to democratisation with the important consequence that organised 
business and labour played a key role in the process. The consolidation of business associations was crucial to the 
evolution of neo-corporatism in the Spain of the 1980s (Molins and Nonell, ibid)  
   In Spain, both in terms of organisational structure and policy, national business associations seemed to move 
away from corporatism to a more pluralist style of interest representation. Schmitter defines pluralism as a ‘system 
of interest representation in which constituent units are organised into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, 
competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined categories which are not specially licensed, recognised, 
subsidised, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state, and which do 
not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories.’ (Schmitter,1979). In 
pluralistic competition, associations are propelled to keep their interest domain homogenous and small, resulting in 
highly specialised and fragmented associational structures (Streeck, 2006).  This move has been associated with, 
above all, a significant increase in the heterogeneity of the membership of associations. (Streeck, ibid). Ever since 
Spain entered the EU in 1986; Spain developed a policy network system with business associations taking a lead 
role.  
   The principal pressure groups in Spain are business organisations, trade union organisations, sectoral groups 
such as agricultural organisations, professional organisations, the Catholic Church and other religious organisations, 
and single issue organisations. The main business organisations are the Spanish Employers’ Federation, whose 
ruling body, the “Confederación Española de Organizaciones empresariales” (CEOE), was set up in 1977. One other 
business association, the High Council of the Chambers of Commerce (Consejo Superior de Cámaras de Comercio) 
is the centre of the Chamber system (Molins and Nonell, Ibid).  
   The main business associations of Catalonia are Foment del Treball Nacional and Pimec- PIMEC SEFES 
which represents small and medium-sized business; FEPIME which represents small and medium-sized business 
adhered to Foment; CECOT, which represents businessmen from the region of Vallès; Cambra de Comerç de 
Barcelona, one of the regional branches of the Chamber of Commerce; and Cercle d´Economia, a think tank. 
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5. Findings 
 
   Networking ranges along a continuum from informal and casual, with occasional information sharing, to highly 
coordinated enterprises with logos and secretariats. Almost without exception, all lobbyists engage in some degree 
of networking. Both associations claim to have a wide circle of friends amongst politicians (Interview Coronas). A 
wide circle of contacts amongst politicians is a key asset for associations seeking influence. Both organisations were 
said to possess one. In this case, both organisations appear to be equally organised.  
 
5.1 Coalitions 
 
   Business associations form alliances in order to promote their interests. A range of different sorts of alliances 
are formed: those around a specific issue; more or less permanent alliances; more or less strategic or tactical, etc. 
Likewise, coalitions can be temporary, ad hoc groups based around single issues in fast changing circumstances, or 
more permanent groupings organised around more enduring, and more formalised relationships with government. 
The informality of coalitions gives policy-making processes the vitality and flexibility required in today’s multi-
level and technical world, allowing as it does for the development of informational relationships and focused goals 
(Coen, 2006). Ad hoc coalitions are most often composed of different types of groups or associations representing 
different sets of interests. The coalition can signal to policy-makers that a policy position has the support of a large 
and varied group of interests and the coalition can provide a framework for a more efficient use of resources 
(Mahoney, 1997).  
   The main ad hoc coalition created with other organisations in order to lobby for the new management 
arrangements is the GTI-4 formed by the Cercle and the Cambra, the Fomento Patronal, and the Real Automóvil 
Club de Catalunya (RACC). GTI-4 has agreed to lobby for a new management structure. The GTI-4 unites these 
four associations around a few issues concerning infrastructure. El Prat is an obvious priority. The GTI-4 is an ad 
hoc coalition because these organisations do not habitually work together. Ad hoc coalitions are flexible and are not 
institutionalised. For that reason, the coalition enjoys a much greater flexibility than is common in more solidified 
forms.  
 
5.3 Affiliation networks  
 
   Representatives from both the Cambra and the Cercle said their affiliation networks included official and 
unofficial appointments and meetings. According to the Cercle, Official functions were said to include GTI-4 
meetings, academic meetings such as the IESE meeting, seminars, conferences and round tables organised by both 
organisations around the issue, and FEMCAT meetings (Interview Alberich). Respondents from the Cambra 
mentioned seminars, meetings with FEMCAT, (formed by businessmen and professionals who get together in order 
to lobby for Barcelona), the IESE meetings, and conferences organised by the Cambra (Interview Curcoll). The 
President of the Cercle also mentioned unofficial meetings with representatives of the local and central government, 
and with the AENA authorities. Lara also asserted that they had meetings with the Secretary of State for Transport 
and with the central government, representatives of the AENA, and the local authorities (Interview Lara).  The 
Cambra tended to focus on official conferences and seminars around the matter, whereas members of the Cercle also 
included informal contacts as being important in the process of negotiation.  
   Interviewees from both associations argued that they were better placed as intermediates than the local 
politicians already dealing with central government because there were no previous issues to corrupt or impede their 
relationship, and they could claim better access to the central authorities in Madrid (Interview Lara).  
   Measured in this way, both organisations would appear to have achieved a significant degree of engagement and 
influence, though the Cercle would seem to be more open about their engagements. Both engage in networking, 
coalition building, and have developed affiliation networks. The Cambra may have a more formal way of 
proceeding than the smaller, more flexible Cercle, but the different internal features of these two business 
organisations does not seem to be reflected in a very different external organisation.  
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5.4 Academia impact 
 
   One very clear consequence of the networking described was the meeting of the IESE (Business School of 
Barcelona) reuniting various strands of civil society in support of a shared management solution. A massive turnout 
indicated a rapprochement between business leaders and civil society on the subject, with extensive media coverage. 
Additional credibility was also given to business associations (Interview Cavallé). The extent of influence exerted 
over academia was also measured on a 0-10 scale, and was given an average score of 5. If the follow through was 
not optimised, it was arguably a considerable mobilisation of civil society and appeared to sensitise Catalan 
politicians to the issue.  
 
2.8 Media impact  
 
   External organisation is also analysed through the media exposure. (Mearshemeier, 2007).  Media impact is an 
important facet of external organisation, as capacity to shape public discourse may be an important determinant of 
influence. Asked to rate the extent of their influence in the media on a 0-10 scale, as regards this particular issue, all 
respondents rated it more than 5. Sources here included four external observers to provide a complementary, more 
objective point of view. Scores were generally higher for the Cercle which would seem to allocate greater 
importance to media communications. Indeed, in the view of some, the Cercle commands more media influence 
(Manchón). On a 0 to 10 scale, the Cercle was rated around 7 on media impact, whereas the Cambra scored only 
around 5 (Interview Manchón) 
   In its public relations, the Cercle in the main uses its president (Interview Lara). In this way, the Cercle 
achieves a considerable impact. Respondents from the Cercle claimed that communication through the president was 
their most direct route to civil society (Interview Rosés). The Cercle has been particularly good at creating its image 
and selling it (Interview Molins). Quite differently, the Cambra communicates with the media through a mix of 
more formal channels, often via its infrastructure department, through the economic press (Interview Nadal). 
Though the President of the Cambra does address the public from time to time, the Cambra’s strategy is more 
formalised, organising campaigns, press conferences, communications vehicles, seminars, and press bulletins 
(Interview Coronas). Overall then, the Cercle tends to adopt a more personalised way of exerting influence in the 
media whereas the Cambra tends to use more official channels. Importantly, external witnesses here give a higher 
mark to the Cercle.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
   The final arrangements for the new shared management of the airport are not yet decided – in particular, the 
relative voting rights of the parties to the solution.  It is already clear though that the great disparity in the internal 
organisation of the Cercle and the Cambra (which may be thought to favour the Cambra) is not carried through to 
their external organisation. Both organisations maintain networks of contacts amongst politicians, and engage on a 
more or less formal footing, assuming some leadership on the issue. Both have entered into GTI-4, with a view to 
moving the issue forward. The Cercle seems to enjoy an edge in media effectiveness and more broadly, would seem 
to have a greater capacity for creating and breaking alliances as needs dictate, as a result of its flexibility. The 
Cambra is a more ponderous networker as a result of its constitutional formality.  
 
   Based on attributed influence then, this study would appear to show great potential differences between 
business associations, in terms of internal organisation – in resourcing, financial capital, membership size - are not 
necessarily reflected in lobbying capacity or effectiveness. Far from it, in this case, the Cercle’s size, flexibility, and 
agility allow it to develop effective, external organisation. 
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Appendices 
 
 Interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews- main questions asked: 
-Does your organisation count with a good circle of contacts? 
-In which coalition (ad hoc or permanent) is your organisation involved? 
-What are your main affiliation networks? (Both official and unofficial). Please develop. 
-Is your networking visible at the level of academia and media impact? Develop. Could you please rate the impact 
form 0 to 10? 
 
External experts interviewed 
 
Joaquín Molins- Professor of Political Science, specialised in interest groups, 10-11-2007 
Andreas Duer- Lecturer at University College, Department of Politics, Dublin, Expert on methodology for 
measuring interest group lobbying results - 31-01-2008 
Dimitris C Christopoulos- Senior Lecturer, Department of Politics, Bristol University specialised on interest groups, 
22-01-2008 
Carlos Cavallé- ex-director of IESE-12-02-2008 
Manel Manchón- journalist Expansión, specialist on Catalan infrastructures- 06-02-2008 
Germà Bel- Professor of Political Economy, Universitat of Barcelona, 29-01-2008 
 
Internal members interviewed: 7 at the technical level and 4 at board level 
 
Alicia Casart –Technical expert at the infrastructure and transport department of the Cambra de Comerç-25-01-2008 
Joan Lloansí- Chief Cabinet of the Cambra de Comerç-05-02-2008 
Albert Salvador- Manager of the Cercle d´Economia- 16-01-2008 
Marta Angerri-Coordinator Cercle d´Economia-17-01-2008 
Salvador Curcoll- Director of the Gabinet of infrastructures and territory of the Cambra de Comerç, 14-03-2008 
Xavier Coronas- ex-under Secretary of the Cambra de Comerç de Barcelona, 21-02-2007 
Marta Rosés- chief press editor of the Cambra de Comerç de Barcelona, 28-01-2008 
José Manuel Lara- President of the Cercle d´Economia, 22-02-2007 
Carlos Güell- ex-president of the Cercle d´Economia, 06-11-2007 
Joan Molins- ex-president of the Cercle d´Economia, 16-05-2008 
Jordi Alberich- General Director of the Cercle d´Economia-18-01-2008 
Miquel Nadal- Director of the foundation RACC, 7-01-2008 
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Glossary 
 
AENA-Aeropuertos Españoles y Navegación Aérea (Nacional Spanish airport and shipping association) 
FEMCAT- Catalan business association  
Generalitat- Catalan government 
GTI-4-Grup de treball d´infrastructures (Infrastructure working group) 
IESE- Barcelona´s business school 
Patronal Fomento del Trabajo Nacional-Catalan business association 
PDA- General Permanent Resource 
Pla Estratègic de Barcelona- Strategic Plan for Barcelona 
PSC- Partit Socialista de Catalunya (Socialist Catalan Party) 
RACC- Real Automóvil Club de Catalunya (Catalan cars association 
 
